Attitudes Towards Objects

Noûs 50 (2):314-328 (2016)
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Abstract
This paper offers a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states, non-propositional attitudes such as loving one’s department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. In broadest terms, the view reached is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. The proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. The proposal also allows one to offer a unified account of the non-propositional attitudes that captures both empty and non-empty cases by properly locating the posited representations in the metaphysical structure of the attitudes.
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2016
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GRZATO-2
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Archival date: 2017-11-14
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Nonexistence.Salmon, Nathan
On Denoting.Russell, Bertrand

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