Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that we think does better. Finally, we disarm the objection that is responsible for dispositionalism’s bad press.

Author Profiles

Alex Grzankowski
Birkbeck, University of London
Mark Textor
King's College London

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