Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions

Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call "Actuality Constraint". The third section of the paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian). This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show (1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2012-11-10
Latest version: 3 (2014-05-02)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Finkish Dispositions.Lewis, David K.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism.Gross, Steven; Tebben, Nicholas & Williams, Michael (eds.)

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
697 ( #5,127 of 50,260 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #11,032 of 50,260 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.