Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions

Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209 (2012)
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Abstract
I maintain that some outcomes, for the most part due to David Lewis, of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify the state of meaning addition by “+” do not exist. And since, of course, sometimes speakers do mean addition by “+”, this entails that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work.
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First archival date: 2012-11-10
Latest version: 3 (2014-05-02)
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References found in this work BETA
Finkish Dispositions.Lewis, David K.
On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals.Manley, David & Wasserman, Ryan

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Citations of this work BETA
Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism.Gross, Steven; Tebben, Nicholas & Williams, Michael (eds.)

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2010-10-07

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