Semantic Dispositionalism and Non-Inferential Knowledge

Philosophia 42 (3):749-759 (2014)
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I discuss Saul Kripke’s Normativity Argument against semantic dispositionalism: I criticize the orthodox interpretation of the argument, defend an alternative reading and argue that, contrary to what Kripke himself seems to have been thinking, the real point of the Normativity Argument is not that meaning is normative.
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First archival date: 2014-01-20
Latest version: 4 (2014-09-13)
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On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Stanley, Jason & Szabó, Zoltán Gendler
On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Stanley, Jason & Gendler Szabó, Zoltan
Against Content Normativity.Glüer, Kathrin & Wikforss, Åsa

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The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Glüer, Kathrin & Wikforss, Asa

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