Conditionals in Theories of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63 (2017)
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Abstract
We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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First archival date: 2016-02-04
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