Many shades of ressentiment

In Ignace Haaz, Jakob Bühlmann Quero & Khushwant Singh (eds.), Ethics and Overcoming Odious Passions: Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism through Shared Human Values in Education. Geneva (Switzerland): Globethics Publications. pp. 33-58 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In philosophical literature, the complex emotional state of ressentiment gained popularity through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment was a bad feeling that reflected the suppressed anger, the pain of impotence, and the general misery of the weak when they compared themselves to the strong and talented members of society. Max Scheler took up Nietzsche’s thesis and described ressentiment as a complex condition characterised by a thirst for revenge. Moreover, ressentiment has the annoying property of presenting itself as having some merit: the modern social and political context offers more than enough examples. First, the aim of this article is to take a closer look at Nietzsche’s ‘man of ressentiment,’ an odious personality characterised by weakness, deep frustrations, and hypocrisy. It will turn out that ressentiment has many different shades that paint a somewhat different picture and raise philosophical questions about positive valuation, vulnerability, and the sense of injustice. Second, we shall be working on the link between the psychology of ressentiment and the temptation to lack integrity in writing, art, or science. The well-described and well-known fact that academic fraudsters evolve in disguise, that they first reactively endorse values very different from their own values, and that these plagiarist authors, second, embark on long-term projects repeating their misdeeds and errors, as if it were normal, are two facts worthy of our attention.

Author Profiles

Ignace Haaz
University of Geneva (PhD)
Ivana Zagorac
University of Zagreb

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-09-01

Downloads
231 (#64,027)

6 months
189 (#14,408)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?