Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
2019
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HABKAA
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-02-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-02-13

Total views
365 ( #18,378 of 2,454,488 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #19,353 of 2,454,488 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.