Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions

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Abstract
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.
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Archival date: 2018-02-13
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References found in this work BETA
Knowing.Stanley, Jason
Skill.Stanley, Jason & Williamson, Timothy
Competence to Know.Miracchi, Lisa

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2018-02-13

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