Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

Author's Profile

Joshua Habgood-Coote
University of Leeds

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-13

Downloads
448 (#19,913)

6 months
47 (#27,721)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?