The generality problem for intellectualism

Mind and Language 33 (3):242-262 (2018)
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According to Intellectualism knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of V-ing. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions which Intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge-how. I argue that Intellectualists face a version of the Generality Problem – familiar from discussions of Reliabilism – since not all ways of V-ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge-how. I consider various responses to this problem, and argue that none are satisfactory.
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Knowing Full Well.Sosa, Ernest
What is Justified Belief.Goldman, Alvin I.
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David
Knowing How.Willlamson, Timothy

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