The Ontological Form of Tropes - Refuting Douglas Ehring’s Main Argument against Standard Trope Nominalism

Philosophia 45 (2):647-658 (2017)
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According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons.
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Abstract Particulars.Campbell, Keith

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