Closing the Hole Argument

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The hole argument purportedly shows that spacetime substantivalism implies a pernicious form of indeterminism. We show that the argument is seductive only because it mistakes a trivial claim (viz. there are isomorphic models) for a significant claim (viz. there are hole isomorphisms). We prove that the latter claim is false -- thereby closing the debate about whether substantivalism implies indeterminism.

Author Profiles

Jb Manchak
University of California, Irvine
Hans Halvorson
Princeton University

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