Indefinite extensibility and the principle of sufficient reason

Philosophical Studies 178 (2):471-492 (2021)
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The principle of sufficient reason threatens modal collapse. Some have suggested that by appealing to the indefinite extensibility of contingent truth, the threat is neutralized. This paper argues that this is not so. If the indefinite extensibility of contingent truth is developed in an analogous fashion to the most promising models of the indefinite extensibility of the concept set, plausible principles permit the derivation of modal collapse.
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First archival date: 2020-06-11
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