Agent-Relative Consequentialism and Collective Self-Defeat

Utilitas 32 (4):472-478 (2020)
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Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of ‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem.

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Matthew Hammerton
Singapore Management University


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