Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent-neutrality

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250 (2019)
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Abstract
The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet, providing an adequate formal account of it has proven difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insights of McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections.
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2019
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HAMDAF-2
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Archival date: 2021-03-20
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