Deontic Constraints are Maximizing Rules
Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (4):571-588 (2020)
Abstract
Deontic constraints prohibit an agent performing acts of a certain type even when doing so will prevent more instances of that act being performed by others. In this article I show how deontic constraints can be interpreted as either maximizing or non-maximizing rules. I then argue that they should be interpreted as maximizing rules because interpreting them as non-maximizing rules results in a problem with moral advice. Given this conclusion, a strong case can be made that consequentialism provides the best account of deontic constraints.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10790-020-09731-8
Analytics
Added to PP
2020-01-10
Downloads
342 (#26,408)
6 months
103 (#7,745)
2020-01-10
Downloads
342 (#26,408)
6 months
103 (#7,745)
Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?