Deontic Constraints are Maximizing Rules

Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (4):571-588 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Deontic constraints prohibit an agent performing acts of a certain type even when doing so will prevent more instances of that act being performed by others. In this article I show how deontic constraints can be interpreted as either maximizing or non-maximizing rules. I then argue that they should be interpreted as maximizing rules because interpreting them as non-maximizing rules results in a problem with moral advice. Given this conclusion, a strong case can be made that consequentialism provides the best account of deontic constraints.
Reprint years
2020
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HAMDCA
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-03-20
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-01-10

Total views
165 ( #35,374 of 64,184 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #10,946 of 64,184 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.