A New Argument from Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism about Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente

Noûs 51 (2):421-428 (2017)
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I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument.
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Archival date: 2019-09-09
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