Betting Democracy on Epistemology

Abstract

In this paper, I examine two major challenges to epistemic theories of democracy: “the authority dilemma” and “the epistemic gamble.” The first is a conceptual challenge, suggesting that epistemic democracy is inherently self-undermining. The second is a normative challenge, asserting that the case for democracy should not rely on precarious epistemic grounds. I argue that both challenges fail. Thus, epistemic theories of democracy escape two of the most popular objections to this view.

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Michael Hannon
Nottingham University

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2024-07-07

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