Being Realistic about Reflective Equilibrium

Analysis 75 (3):514-522 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation calls for an explanation. We show that Scanlon does not have the resources to offer such an explanation.

Author Profiles

Hannah Altehenger
Universität Konstanz
Simon Gaus
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Leonhard Menges
University of Salzburg


Added to PP

832 (#14,479)

6 months
80 (#46,302)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?