Lange on essentialism, counterfactuals, and explanation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):81 – 85 (2005)
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Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is - with minor modification - compatible with essentialism.
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The Big Bad Bug: What Are the Humean's Chances?Bigelow, John; Collins, John & Pargetter, Robert

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