Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):584-604 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-20

Downloads
720 (#10,291)

6 months
45 (#22,033)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?