Two Claims About Desert

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):41-56 (2013)
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Many philosophers claim that it is always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that there is always at least some reason to give people what they deserve. I highlight problems with this view and defend an alternative. I have two aims. First, I want to expose a gap in certain desert-based justifications of punishment. Second, I want to show that those of us who have intuitions at odds with these justifications have an alternative account of desert at our disposal – one that may lend our intuitions more credibility

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Nathan Hanna
Drexel University


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