The metaphysics of causal models: Where's the biff?
Erkenntnis 68 (2):149-68 (2008)
Abstract
This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HANTMO-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-06-05
View upload history
View upload history

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Causation.Lewis, David
Causation as Influence.Lewis, David
View all 20 references / Add more references

Metaphysical Causation.Wilson, Alastair
Interventionist Counterfactuals.Briggs, Rachael
A Regularity Theoretic Approach to Actual Causation.Baumgartner, Michael
View all 10 citations / Add more citations
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total downloads
337 ( #7,330 of 37,125 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #19,965 of 37,125 )
2009-01-28
Total downloads
337 ( #7,330 of 37,125 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #19,965 of 37,125 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.