The metaphysics of causal models: Where's the biff?

Erkenntnis 68 (2):149-68 (2008)
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Abstract
This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.
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HANTMO-2
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Archival date: 2014-06-05
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References found in this work BETA
Causation.Lewis, David
Causation and Counterfactuals.Collins, John; Hall, Ned & Paul, Laurie (eds.)

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Citations of this work BETA
Metaphysical Causation.Wilson, Alastair

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2009-01-28

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