Why punitive intent matters

Analysis 81 (3):426-435 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-03-22
Latest version: 2 (2021-12-08)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
130 ( #40,519 of 64,251 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
73 ( #9,386 of 64,251 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.