Concomitant Ignorance Excuses from Moral Responsibility

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):58-65 (2021)
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Abstract

Some philosophers contend that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility for wrongdoing. An agent is concomitantly ignorant with respect to wrongdoing if and only if her ignorance is non-culpable, but she would freely have performed the same action if she were not ignorant. I, however, argue that concomitant ignorance excuses. I show that leading accounts of moral responsibility imply that concomitant ignorance excuses, and I debunk the view that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility

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Robert J. Hartman
Ohio Northern University

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