Concomitant Ignorance Excuses from Moral Responsibility

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):58-65 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Some philosophers contend that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility for wrongdoing. An agent is concomitantly ignorant with respect to wrongdoing if and only if her ignorance is non-culpable, but she would freely have performed the same action if she were not ignorant. I, however, argue that concomitant ignorance excuses. I show that leading accounts of moral responsibility imply that concomitant ignorance excuses, and I debunk the view that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility

Author's Profile

Robert J. Hartman
Ohio Northern University


Added to PP

910 (#15,076)

6 months
271 (#8,446)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?