Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):136-150 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is almost unanimously accepted that Kant denies resultant moral luck—that is, he denies that the lucky consequence of a person’s action can affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Philosophers often point to the famous good will passage at the beginning of the Groundwork to justify this claim. I argue, however, that this passage does not support Kant’s denial of resultant moral luck. Subsequently, I argue that Kant allows agents to be morally responsible for certain kinds of lucky consequences. Even so, I argue that it is unclear whether Kant ultimately endorses resultant moral luck. The reason is that Kant does not write enough on moral responsibility for consequences to determine definitively whether he thinks that the lucky consequence for which an agent is morally responsible can add to her degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. The clear upshot, however, is that Kant does not deny resultant moral luck.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HARKDN
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-05-16
Latest version: 4 (2021-09-07)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-05-16

Total views
822 ( #6,279 of 2,449,138 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #44,576 of 2,449,138 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.