Accounting for the Specious Present: A Defense of Enactivism

Journal of Mind and Behavior 39 (3):181-204 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. I then argue that this view, which is a version of enactivism, best explains the temporality of conscious experience—what is often called the specious present.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-12-12
Latest version: 2 (2018-12-14)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
54 ( #32,948 of 42,123 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #26,379 of 42,123 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.