Compensation as Moral Repair and as Moral Justification for Risks.

Ethics, Politics, and Society 2 (1):33-63 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologetic compensation and non-apologetic compensation. Apologetic compensation, I argue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer of money, goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore loss or harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view that acts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologetic compensation is sufficient for moral repair.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HAYCAM-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-08-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-03-18

Total views
131 ( #41,668 of 65,766 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #31,267 of 65,766 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.