Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement

Episteme (1):1-25 (2013)
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Abstract

Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community

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Allan Hazlett
Washington University in St. Louis

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