Reply to Adams and Clarke

Logos and Episteme 7 (2):221-225 (2016)
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Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick’s method-relativized theory, the method M in question in any given case must be generally reliable.
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Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.Briggs, Rachael & Nolan, Daniel

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Rejoinder to Haze.Adams, Fred & Clarke, Murray

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