Reconciling the Epistemic and the Zetetic

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):93-100 (2022)
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In recent work, Jane Friedman has argued that commonly accepted epistemic norms conflict with a basic instrumental principle of inquiry, according to which one ought to take the necessary means to resolving one’s inquiry. According to Friedman, we ought to reject the epistemic norms in question and accept instead that the only genuine epistemic norms are zetetic norms—norms that govern inquiry. I argue that there is a more attractive way out of the conflict, one which reconciles the epistemic and the zetetic.

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Eliran Haziza
Hebrew University of Jerusalem


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