Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure

Utilitas 30 (2):219-227 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of one’s attitudes.

Author's Profile

Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-19

Downloads
670 (#21,362)

6 months
92 (#39,144)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?