A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement

Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368 (2016)
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Abstract
In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies---in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View---are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.
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2016
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First archival date: 2016-01-19
Latest version: 2 (2016-11-17)
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References found in this work BETA
Against Method.Feyerabend, Paul
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David

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Citations of this work BETA
Disagreement.Matheson, Jonathan & Frances, Bryan
Group Disagreement: A Belief Aggregation Perspective.Skipper, Mattias & Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn

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2015-09-07

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