Being Reasonable

Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):187-195 (2012)
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Abstract
Although feminists have spilled a great deal of ink criticizing Enlightenment conceptions of rationality, the time has come to consider constructing a positive account. Recent attempts to construct an account of rationality as a virtue concept reflect many feminist complaints concerning Enlightenment rationality, and, thus, I maintain that feminism should take seriously such a conception. Virtue rationality offers a more diverse account of rationality without sacrificing the fundamental normativity of the concept. Furthermore, the narrower concept of reasonableness, promises to provide a ground for distinguishing among better and worse epistemic perspectives, which is a task critical to the success of the feminist project.
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ISBN(s)
0897-2346
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HEIBR-6
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Archival date: 2016-02-28
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