The Confirmational Significance of Agreeing Measurements

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):721-732 (2013)
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Agreement between "independent" measurements of a theoretically posited quantity is intuitively compelling evidence that a theory is, loosely speaking, on the right track. But exactly what conclusion is warranted by such agreement? I propose a new account of the phenomenon's epistemic significance within the framework of Bayesian epistemology. I contrast my proposal with the standard Bayesian treatment, which lumps the phenomenon under the heading of "evidential diversity".

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Casey Helgeson
Pennsylvania State University


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