'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness

Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: e is some way as regards its subject; e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; e is some way in the awareness of its subject; e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HELTSI
Revision history
Archival date: 2012-11-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
925 ( #1,628 of 37,191 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
41 ( #8,691 of 37,191 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.