Strict conditionals: A negative result

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):536–549 (2006)
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Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural-language conditionals in a satisfactory way.

Author Profiles

Jan Heylen
KU Leuven
Leon Horsten
Universität Konstanz


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