Transcendental Knowability, Closure, Luminosity and Factivity: Reply to Stephenson

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 27 (1) (2023)
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Abstract

Stephenson (2022) has argued that Kant’s thesis that all transcendental truths are transcendentally a priori knowable leads to omniscience of all transcendental truths. His arguments depend on luminosity principles and closure principles for transcendental knowability. We will argue that one pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the closure principle is too strong, while the other pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the luminosity principle is too strong. Stephenson’s argument also depends on a factivity principle for transcendental knowability, which we will argue to be false.

Author Profiles

Felipe Morales Carbonell
University of Chile
Jan Heylen
KU Leuven

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