Making Fit Fit

Philosophy of Science 84 (5):931-943 (2017)
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Reductionist accounts of objective chance rely on a notion of fit, which ties the chances at a world to the frequencies at that world. Here, I criticize extant measures of the fit of a chance system and draw on recent literature in epistemic utility theory to propose a new model: chances fit a world insofar as they are accurate at that world. I show how this model of fit does a better job of explaining the normative features of chance, its role in the laws of nature, and its status as an expert function than do previous accounts.

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Michael Townsen Hicks
University of Birmingham


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