Dispositional and categorical properties, and Russellian Monism

Philosophical Studies 176 (1):65-92 (2019)
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Abstract
This paper has two main aims. The first is to present a general approach for understanding “dispositional” and “categorical” properties; the second aim is to use this approach to criticize Russellian Monism. On the approach I suggest, what are usually thought of as “dispositional” and “categorical” properties are really just the extreme ends of a spectrum of options. The approach allows for a number of options between these extremes, and it is plausible, I suggest, that just about everything of scientific interest falls in this middle ground. I argue that Russellian Monism depends for its plausibility on the unarticulated assumption that there are no properties in the middle ground.
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Archival date: 2018-03-28
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Ramseyan Humility.Lewis, David K.

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