Abstract

Yogācāra is a tradition of Buddhist philosophy that made important contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. While contemporary philosophers have engaged with these aspects of Yogācāra, few authors have explored the implications of Yogācāra for moral theory. In this paper, I aim to fill this gap by constructing an argument for impartial benevolence or compassion that draws on the resources of the Yogācāra tradition. According to an influential interpretation of Yogācāra, ultimate reality consists in the flow of perceptions and experience, empty of the subject-object duality. I argue that, if this understanding of ultimate reality is correct, then we are unable to individuate streams of consciousness from one another. Yet I contend that there is an intrinsic normative distinction between my suffering and the suffering of others only if we can individuate streams of consciousness. Thus, there is not an intrinsic normative distinction between my suffering and the suffering of others. It follows from this conclusion that the suffering of all beings should be impartially prevented without distinction. I suggest that this argument can help explain how the impartial compassion of bodhisattvas flows from their insight into the nature of reality.