From Isolation to Skepticism
Erkenntnis 81 (3):649-668 (2016)
Abstract
If moral properties lacked causal powers, would moral skepticism be true? I argue that it would. Along the way I respond to various arguments that it would not.
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Archival date: 2018-01-28
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2015-08-26
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168 ( #38,824 of 69,033 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #54,177 of 69,033 )
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