Group Dispositional Belief, Information Possession, and “Epistemic Explosion”: A Further Reply to Jesper Kallestrup

Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (5):8-16 (2023) Copy BIBT_EX

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Author Profiles

Portland State University

R. Wolfe Randall

University of California at Santa Barbara

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Archival date: 2023-05-18
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Categories

Objections to Extended Cognition in Philosophy of Mind

Social Epistemology in Epistemology

Socially Extended Cognition in Philosophy of Mind

Tacit and Dispositional Belief in Philosophy of Mind

The Extended Mind Thesis in Philosophy of Mind

Keywords

Non-summative group cognition Dispositional Belief Extended mind thesis Cognitive bloat

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