Natureza e artifício: Leibniz e os modernos sobre a concepção dos corpos orgânicos como máquinas

Dois Pontos 15 (1):95-109 (2018)
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Abstract
In modernity, the distinction between nature and artifice disappears, so that machines made by men become privileged models for the explanation of natural bodies, as can be observed in Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, among others. This new relationship between nature and artifice is correlated with the mechanization and refutation of finality in nature, insofar as the adoption of mechanics as a model of nature’s explanation is associated to the rejection of the use of final causes in physics and to the conception that bodies are devoid of immanent principles of movement or of any incorporeal principle that predisposes them to a process of change teleologically structured and oriented. Leibniz also conceives nature as artifice and organic bodies as automata, but his conception of natural bodies as artificial machines goes even further, to the point of characterizing the natural beings as those which carry the character of artificial rather than the artificial things themselves. However, unlike Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes, Leibniz uses the analogy of nature as a machine and deepens it precisely to argue that nature is teleologically structured and that the difference between the machines made by men and the natural (divine) ones lies in the fact that while those have a purely extrinsic finality, these have an immanent finality inscribed in each of their parts to infinity.
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Archival date: 2018-11-04
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Aristóteles, Física I-II.Lucas Angioni - 2009 - Editora da Unicamp.

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