Foot Without Achilles’ Heel

Philosophia 47 (5):1501-1515 (2019)
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It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumption is false, at least for Philippa Foot’s view. Our argument blocks a widespread objection to Foot’s view, and it shows how virtue ethics in general can neutralize such worries.
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First archival date: 2019-03-15
Latest version: 2 (2019-06-02)
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