Foot Without Achilles’ Heel

Philosophia 47 (5):1501-1515 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumption is false, at least for Philippa Foot’s view. Our argument blocks a widespread objection to Foot’s view, and it shows how virtue ethics in general can neutralize such worries.

Author Profiles

Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University
Katharina Nieswandt
Concordia University

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-03-13

Downloads
646 (#20,479)

6 months
164 (#13,973)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?