We cannot infer by accepting testimony
Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2589-2598 (2019)
Abstract
While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
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Archival date: 2018-07-17
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2018-07-14
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20 ( #32,462 of 64,247 )
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