We cannot infer by accepting testimony

Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2589-2598 (2019)
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While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
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References found in this work BETA
The Enigma of Reason.Sperber, Dan & Mercier, Hugo (eds.)
What is Inference?Boghossian, Paul
Understanding Why.Hills, Alison
Understanding Why.Hills, Alison

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