We cannot infer by accepting testimony

Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2589-2598 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HLOWCI
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-07-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-07-14

Total views
516 ( #12,373 of 64,247 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #32,462 of 64,247 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.