Intentional Models as Essential Scientific Tools

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In this article, I argue that the use of scientific models that attribute intentional content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology as a type of phenomenal model, and argue that this makes them as essential as any other model of this type
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Archival date: 2015-08-16
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