Meaning underdetermines what is said, therefore utterances express many propositions

Dialectica 72 (2):165-189 (2018)
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Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said. This has consequences for philosophical accounts of meaning, communication, and propositional attitude reports. I argue that the consequence we should endorse is that utterances typically express many propositions, that these are what speakers mean, and that the correct semantics for attitude reports will handle this fact while being relational and propositional.
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Archival date: 2019-08-25
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