Can Heil's ontological conception accommodate complex properties?

In Michael Esfeld (ed.), John Heil. Symposium on his Ontological Point of View. ontos verlag (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
A central tenet of Heil's ontological conception is a no-levels account of reality, according to which there is just one class of basic properties and relations, while all higher-level entities are configurations of these base-level entities. I argue that if this picture is not to collapse into an eliminativist picture of the world – which, I contend, should be avoided –, Heil's ontological framework has to be supplemented by an independent theory of which configurations of basic entities should count as complex entities. However, such an amendment represents a substantial ontological enhancement, so that the ensuing ontological picture is not as parsimonious as Heil claims it to be.
No keywords specified (fix it)
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2010-12-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total downloads
205 ( #12,563 of 37,100 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #19,884 of 37,100 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.