Lucky Achievement: Virtue Epistemology on the Value of Knowledge

Ratio 31 (3):303-311 (2018)
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Abstract
Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief.
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2018
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First archival date: 2018-01-01
Latest version: 4 (2018-02-09)
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2018-01-01

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