Hvorfor handlingskunnskap ikke er slutningsbasert

Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 52 (4):161-179 (2017)
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Abstract
The paper discusses the epistemological basis for how you know what you are doing intentionally (and why). In particular, it challenges and ulimately rejects the claim made by Sarah K. Paul that such knowledge has an inferential basis.
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Archival date: 2020-05-28
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