Fairness and Fair Shares

Utilitas 23 (1):88 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share of a common task, if others won’t do their fair share – each agent’s fair share being what they would be required to do if all contributed as they should. This seems to provide a strong basis for objecting to such principles. For it seems unfair to require agents who have already done their fair share to do more, just because other agents won’t do their fair share. The philosopher who has written most about this issue, however, Liam Murphy, argues that it is not unfair to do so, at least in the standard sense of that term. In this paper, I give Murphy’s reasons for saying this, explain why I think he’s wrong, and then say a little about why this issue might be important.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HORFAF-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-07-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-12-26

Total views
122 ( #20,795 of 39,608 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #29,373 of 39,608 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.